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which counsel may be obtained. In any event, the Settles case
represents another affirmative effort by the Court to "breathe life
into the requirement that a waiver of a constitutional right. . . be
competent, intelligent and voluntary." '
Gregory J. 0O'Connell

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

N. Y. U. C. C. § 3-419: Contractcause of action exists againstbank for
collecting an instrument over forged indorsement
Prior to the passage of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),
the payee of a negotiable instrument possessed valid causes of action in contract and tort against a bank that had collected the
instrument over a forged indorsement. 217 By exercising control
through collection in such a situation, the bank converted the instrument, and its liability for the conversion was limited by the 3year tort statute of limitations. 28 The payee, however, could elect
to ratify the bank's collection of the instrument, thereby waiving the
conversion remedy, and proceed under an implied contract for
money had and received, 289 with the resultant benefit of the longer
not depend on whether the defendant was represented. Id.
'u People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 484, 348 N.E.2d 894, 898, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 422
(1976).
2n Henderson v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 303 N.Y. 27, 100 N.E.2d 117 (1951) (contract); Hillsley v. State Bank, 24 App. Div. 2d 28, 263 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1st Dep't 1965) (tort),
affl'd, 18 N.Y.2d 952, 223 N.E.2d 571, 277 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1966); Spaulding v. First Nat'l Bank,
210 App. Div. 216, 205 N.Y.S. 492 (4th Dep't) (tort), aff'd mem., 239 N.Y. 586, 147 N.E 206
(1924); E. Moch Co. v. Security Bank, 176 App. Div. 842, 163 N.Y.S. 277 (1st Dep't 1917)
(tort or contract), affl'd, 225 N.Y. 723, 122 N.E. 879 (1919). See generally Note, Depositary
Bank Liability Under § 3-419(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 31 WAsH. & LEE L. Rxv.
676 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Depositary Bank Liability].
2m E. Mach Co. v. Security Bank, 176 App. Div. 842, 163 N.Y.S. 277 (1st Dep't 1917),
affl'd, 225 N.Y. 723, 122 N.E. 879 (1919); see CPLR 214(4) (1972 & Supp. 1978-1979). Since
the payee's indorsement had been forged, no title passed; therefore, when the bank processed
the instrument for collection, it committed a conversion by wrongfully exercising control over
a chattel to which it had no valid title. See E. Moch Co. v. Security Bank, 176 App. Div. at
846, 163 N.Y.S. at 280. The statute of limitations in tort runs from the date of the conversion.
General Stencils, Inc. v. Chiappa, 18 N.Y.2d 125, 127, 219 N.E.2d 169, 170, 272 N.Y.S.2d 337,
339 (1966).
2U E. Moch Co. v. Security Bank, 176 App. Div. 842, 846, 163 N.Y.S. 277, 280 (1st Dep't
1917), affld, 225 N.Y. 723, 122 N.E. 879 (1919). Since the collecting bank in Hechter had no
title to the instrument because of the forged indorsement, see note 288 supra, by endeavoring
to collect on the instrument, it became
an agent [of the payee] for the purpose of collecting from the drawee bank the
proceeds of the check delivered to it. When it [took] the check for collection, it
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6-year statute of limitations for contract actions.29 With the enactment of section 3-419 of the UCC, 91 uncertainty arose whether the
payee of a wrongfully collected instrument still could maintain an
action in contract against the collecting banks." 2 Recently, in
assent[ed] to the agency and [became] bound by the terms of the instrument
received. Those terms include[d] an obligation to pay the proceeds collected to the
true payee owner in the absence of a valid indorsement. The moment the collecting
bank receive[d] the proceeds it [held] money belonging to the owner of the check
and [became] a debtor of such owner and of no one else in the absence of a valid
indorsement.
Henderson v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 303 N.Y. 27, 33, 100 N.E.2d 117, 120 (1951)
(emphasis in original).
The agency relationship created by the bank's holding of the proceeds for the payee
established the privity that was necessary for the payee to maintain an action in contract
against the collecting bank. See Henderson v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 303 N.Y. 27, 32,
100 N.E.2d 117, 120 (1951) (quoting National Union Bank v. Miller Rubber Co., 148 Md. 449,
455-56, 129 A. 688, 690 (1925)); 9 C.J.S. Banks and Banking § 357(c)(1) (1938). In order for
the payee to claim that the funds collected were rightfully his, it also was required that the
payee ratify the bank's collection of the check. DepositaryBank Liability, supra note 287, at
683.
Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, the payee had no cause of action in contract
against the drawee bank due to the absence of privity. Henderson v. Lincoln Rochester Trust
Co., 303 N.Y. 27, 31-32, 100 N.E.2d 117, 119 (1951). Thus, as against the drawee bank, the
payee was limited to a suit for conversion. Id. at 31, 100 N.E.2d at 119; Sonnenburg v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 87 Misc. 2d 202, 204, 383 N.Y.S.2d 863, 865 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1976); Forman v. First Nat'l Bank, 66 Misc. 2d 433, 434, 320 N.Y.S.2d 648, 649 (Sup.
Ct. Sullivan County 1971); accord, National Union Bank v. Miller Rubber Co., 148 Md. 449,
129 A. 688, 690 (1925).
"I0See CPLR 213(2) (1972 & Supp 1978-1979). The action on the implied contract between the payee and the collecting bank accrues when the bank receives the proceeds from
the drawee. Henderson v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 303 N.Y. 27, 33, 100 N.E.2d 117, 119
(1951).
When more than one legal remedy is available to a plaintiff, the statute of limitations
applicable to the action is that which governs the remedy the plaintiff elects to pursue.
Dentists' Supply Co. v. Cornelius, 281 App. Div. 306, 307, 119 N.Y.S.2d 570, 571 (1st Dep't),
affl'd, 306 N.Y. 624, 116 N.E.2d 238 (1953). Thus, where the payee of a negotiable instrument
sues in conversion, the statute of limitations is 3 years, but should the payee choose to sue in
contract, the action is subject to a 6-year time limitation.
In addition to time limitations, the amount of the damages that are recoverable also
may be an important consideration in the payee's election of remedies. Prior to the enactment
of the UCC, although the amount of recovery in tort was prima facie the face value of the
instrument, Depositary Bank Liability, supra note 287, at 683, a bank could prove that
because of the drawer's insolvency or some other reason, the actual value of the instrument
was less than the face amount. See E. Moch Co. v. Security Bank, 176 App. Div. 842, 847,
163 N.Y.S. 277, 281 (1917), affl'd, 225 N.Y. 723, 122 N.E. 879 (1919). Under a contract theory,
recovery would be the amount that the bank collected. Id.; accord, Mackey-Woodard, Inc.
v. Citizens State Bank, 197 Kan. 536, 419 P.2d 847, 853 (1966). The UCC left undisturbed
these measures of recovery in actions against parties other than the drawee; the latter's
liability is absolutely deemed the face value of the instrument. N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-419, Comment
4 (McKinney 1964).
291N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-419 (McKinney 1964).
292 N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-419 (McKinney 1964) provides in pertinent part:
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Hechter v. New York Life Insurance Co., 293 the Court of Appeals
held that a payee still possesses a contract cause of action against a
collecting bank subject to a 6-year limitations period." 4
The plaintiff, named payee on three checks representing the
proceeds of life insurance policies on her husband,2 5 authorized her
attorney to deposit the checks into her bank account. 26 The attor-

ney, however, forged the plaintiff's indorsement and deposited the
checks into his own account.2 97 The plaintiff eventually obtained a

default judgment against the attorney.2 8 The default judgment was
never satisfied, and the plaintiff therefore commenced an action
against the collecting bank.2 99 By this time, however, more than 5

years had passed since the attorney had deposited the instruments. 00 The collecting bank' moved for summary judgment on
(1) An instrument is converted when
(c) it is paid on a forged indorsement.
According to the New York annotations, "[s]ubsection (1)(c) adopts the result in such
cases as Henderson v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co... . under which payment on a forged
indorsement constitutes conversion of the instrument." N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-419, N.Y. Annots. at
372 (McKinney 1964): The Henderson Court, however, also held that the payee had a valid
cause of action in contract against a collecting bank. 303 N.Y. 27, 32, 100 N.E.2d 117, 120
(1951). The UCC's failure to address expressly the contract cause of action has created
confusion concerning the continued validity of this common-law action. Two lower courts
have indicated that the action in contract has survived. See Sonnenberg v. Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co., 87 Misc. 2d 202, 204, 383 N.Y.S.2d 863, 865 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976);
Forman v. First Nat'l Bank, 66 Misc. 2d 433, 434, 320 N.Y.S.2d 648, 649 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan
County 1971).
29346 N.Y.2d 34, 385 N.E.2d 551, 412 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1978), aff'g 59 App. Div. 2d 1069,
399 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1st Dep't 1977) (mem.).
2" Id. at 39-40, 385 N.E.2d at 554-55, 412 N.Y.S. 2d at 815. The Court, however, did not
decide the conditions under which the bank would be liable. Id. at 38 & n.3, 385 N.E.2d at
553 & n.3, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 814 & n.3; see notes 319-322 and accompanying text infra.
295 46 N.Y.2d at 36, 385 N.E.2d at 552, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 813. The three checks were drawn
in April 1970, and totaled more than $135,000. Id.
299Id.

217
Id. The attorney maintained a personal account with Chemical Bank, where he deposited the plaintiff's checks. After the checks had been processed for collection and honored by
the drawee banks, the attorney withdrew all the money in his account, including the funds
belonging to the plaintiff. Id.
293Id.
" Id. The action was instituted against Chemical Bank, the depository bank in the
collection process. Id.
"I Id. Because more than 3 years had passed since the attorney had deposited the checks,
the conversion actions against the drawee and collecting banks were time-barred. See note
288 and accompanying text supra. Since the plaintiff was limited to an action in conversion
against the drawee bank, see note 289 supra, she had no valid action against this bank. The
attorney had long absconded with her funds, leaving the plaintiff with a viable action only
in contract against the collecting banks, provided such a cause of action survived the adoption
of the UCC.
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the grounds that section 3-419(1)(c) of the UCC had abolished the
contract action against a collecting bank for wrongfully collecting
an instrument over a forged indorsement, and that since the 3-year
tort statute of limitations had expired, the plaintiff's suit was timebarred. 2 Special term denied the motion, 33 and the appellate divi3 4
sion unanimously affirmed.

In a unanimous opinion written by Judge Cooke,"0 5 the Court
of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the UCC did not abolish the
contract remedy.3 0 The Court observed that the contract action at
common law was merely an illustration of the general rule that "a
litigant may abandon his tort cause of action in favor of one
grounded in contract.

' 37

While section 3-419 codifies the common-

law principle that collection over a forged indorsement constitutes
the tort of conversion,3 0° the Court held that the section does not
preclude the plaintiff from electing to proceed on a contract theory
and, consequently, taking advantage of the 6-year statute of limitations. 3° Moreover, the Court found that the legislature had no design to abrogate the contract cause of action when it enacted section
"I Chemical Bank's status as a collecting bank under the UCC was clear. 46 N.Y.2d at
36 & n.1, 385 N.E.2d at 552 & n.1, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 813 & n.1. A "collecting bank" is "any
bank handling the item for collection except the payor bank." UCC 4-105(d).
302 See 46 N.Y.2d at 36, 38, 385 N.E.2d at 552, 554, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 813, 814; note 288
supra. Chemical also sought summary judgment on the grounds that the indorsement of the
plaintiff's signature was not forged inasmuch as the attorney was authorized to deposit the
checks and, at any rate, the plaintiff had subsequently ratified the forged indorsements. Brief
for Defendant-Appellant at 4 n. The trial judge held these contentions presented issues of
fact for the jury to determine and Chemical Bank did not appeal this decision. 46 N.Y.2d at
36 n.2, 385 N.E.2d at 553 n.2, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 813 n.2; Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 4 n.
46 N.Y.2d at 36, 385 N.E.2d at 552-53, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
30, Id. at 36-37, 385 N.E.2d at 553, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
All the judges joined in the opinion of Judge Cooke except Judge Fuchsberg who did
not participate in the decision. Id. at 40, 385 N.E.2d at 555, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
301Id. at 39-40, 385 N.E.2d at 554-55, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 815. The Court held, therefore,
that the plaintiff's action was not time-barred because it was commenced before the 6-year
contract statute of limitations had expired. Id.
311Id. at 38, 385 N.E.2d at 554, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 814 (citing Terry v. Munger, 121 N.Y.
161, 24 N.E. 272 (1890)); see E. Moch Co. v. Security Bank, 176 App. Div. 842, 847, 163
N.Y.S. 277, 281 (1st Dep't 1917), affl'd, 225 N.Y. 723, 122 N.E. 879 (1919).
30. See note 288 and accompanying text supra.
"1 46 N.Y.2d at 38-39, 385 N.E.2d at 554, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 814-15. The Court noted that
it previously had recognized the uncertainty surrounding a collecting bank's liability following the enactment of section 3-419(3) of the Code. Id., see N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-419(3) (McKinney
1964); Hutzler v. Hertz Corp., 39 N.Y.2d 209, 217 n.3, 347 N.E.2d 627, 632 n.3, 383 N.Y.S.2d
266, 270 n.3 (1976); note 320 and accompanying text infra. The Hechter Court stated, however, that Hutzler did not "imply that such liability, if it continues to exist, may be asserted
only in a conversion action." 46 N.Y.2d at 39, 385 N.E.2d at 554, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
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3-419.311 Since the UCC was meant to be supplemented by the common law "[u]nless displaced by the particularprovisions of [the]
Act," ' the Court reasoned that the absence of a specific statutory
nullification of the contract remedy indicated that the legislature
had not intended to restrict the plaintiff's recourse to a suit for
conversion.31 2 To the contrary, the Court found in section 3-419(3),
which states that the collecting bank is not liable "in conversion or
otherwise" when it has dealt with the instrument "in good faith and
in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards . . . [of]
the business,"3 13 a legislative purpose to continue all pre-UCC theo3 4
ries of recovery, subject to the defenses provided by that section. 1
The significance of the Hechter Court's determination that the
UCC did not supplant the contractual liability at common law of a
collecting bank to the payee of an instrument collected over a forged
indorsement is that a payee often may not become aware of the
3 15
forgery until after the expiration of the tort statute of limitations.
It is submitted that it would be manifestly unjust to foreclose the
innocent payee from recourse against the collecting bank, which
often represents the only feasible source of recovery." ' Moreover, the
"1 46 N.Y.2d at 39, 385 N.E.2d at 554, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
UCC 1-103 (emphasis added).
46 N.Y.2d at 39, 385 N.E.2d at 554, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 815. The Court stated that,
"[u]nder the plain import of this section, nothing short of an express code provision limiting
plaintiff's remedy to a conversion suit would suffice to destroy the action ex contractu."Id.
(emphasis in original). The Court also relied on the basic principles of statutory construction
that an unambiguous legislative intent is necessary to negate a rule of common law. Id.; see,
e.g., Jones v. City of Albany, 151 N.Y. 223, 228, 45 N.E. 557 (1896).
31 N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-419(3) (McKinney 1964) provides:
Subject to the provisions of this Act concerning restrictive indorsements a
representative, including a depositary or collecting bank, who has in good faith and
in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards applicable to the business
of such representative dealt with an instrument or its proceeds on behalf of one who
was not the true owner is not liable in conversion or otherwise to the true owner
beyond the amount of any proceeds remaining in his hands.
31146 N.Y.2d at 39, 385 N.E.2d at 554, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
315 See, e.g., Sonnenberg v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 87 Misc. 2d 202, 383
N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976); Gerber v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 64
Misc. 2d 687, 315 N.Y.S.2d 601 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1970). In Hechter,the plaintiff
did not learn of the attorney's illegal conduct until after the expiration of the conversion
statute of limitations. See Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent at 1.
318In a situation such as that found in Hechter the forger often has disappeared or is
insolvent. See note 289 supra. Thus, without a contract action against the collecting bank,
actions commenced without the 3-year tort statute of limitations would be limited to suits
against the drawer of the instrument under section 3-804. N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-804 (McKinney
1964). Such actions, however, would require the plaintiff to post a security "not less than
twice the amount allegedly unpaid on the instrument." Id. The prohibitive burden that this
can place on the plaintiff is illustrated by the Hechter case where the checks represented more
S

32
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decision comports with fundamentals of statutory construction that
require an unambiguous or explicit provision to negate a common3 17
law rule.
By specifically holding that section 3-419 did not abolish the
contract cause of action, the Court has resolved one of the problems
that has arisen in cases involving that section.3 Difficulties remain,
however, in determining the circumstances under which a collecting
bank would be liable, regardless of the form of the action.3 19 Section
3-419(3) seems to provide immunity for a depositary or collecting
bank that has acted reasonably and in good faith, whether the suit
lies in "conversion or otherwise."'321 The Court's interpretation of the
than $135,000. 46 N.Y.2d at 36, 385 N.E.2d at 552, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 813. On the other hand,
at least in the case of the depository bank in the collection process, the bank deals directly
with the wrongdoer and is in a better positidn to prevent such improper payments. It is
submitted that it would not be unfair to make the depositary bank bear the loss. See also
Note, Payee v. Depositary Bank: What is the UCC Defense to Handling Checks Bearing
Forged Indorsements?, 45 COLO. L. REv. 281, 297-304, 313 (1974).
In addition, prohibiting a direct suit against the collecting banks forces the plaintiff to
sue the drawer or drawee, thus beginning a series of lawsuits leading circuitously to the
collecting banks. As stated by one commentator:
If [the payee] sues the drawer, the drawer will insist that that the drawee recredit
his account and the drawee will then sue the depositary bank on the warranties of
good title a depositary bank gives to the drawee when he passes a check down the
collection stream. If our payee-owner sues the drawee directly, the same result
follows: drawee pays payee and drawee sues depositary bank on the warranties.
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 15-4, at 503 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as WHITE & SUMMERS]. The direct suit against the depositary or collecting bank is not only
more economical, since it avoids additional suits and the need to implead additional parties,
but often results in making available more convenient defendants. Id. at 503-04. The thief
who has stolen the instrument usually will negotiate it at a local bank, though it may have
been drawn on a drawee bank located in another jurisdiction. In this situation, it would be
less burdensome for the innocent owner of the negotiable instrument to sue the local bank.
Moreover, as noted, by the Hechter Court, see id. at 504, if the reverse were true and the thief
cashed the instrument in a depositary bank located in another city and the drawee bank were
the owner's local bank, the owner could still commence an action against the drawee bank
under UCC § 3-419.
311
See, e.g., Jones v. City of Albany, 151 N.Y. 223, 228, 45 N.E. 557, 560 (1896); UCC §
1-103; notes 25 & 26 and accompanying text supra. The UCC itself "'derives from the
common law' and 'assumes the continuing existence of a large body of pre-Code and nonCode law on which it rests for support,' without which the Code 'could not survive.' WHrr
& SUMMERS, supra note 316, at 6 (quoting Gilmore, Article 9: What It Does for the Past, 26
LA. L. REV. 285, 285-86 (1966)).
3I For a discussion of the ambiguities existing in section 3-419, see WtIrE & SUMMERS,
supra note 316, at 499-509.
"I See Hutzler v. Hertz Corp., 39 N.Y.2d 209, 217 n.3, 347 N.E.2d 627, 632 n.3, 383
N.Y.S.2d 266, 270 n.3 (1976); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 316, at 502-09; Note, In Defense
of U.C. C. § 3-419(3), 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 972 (1978); DepositaryBank Liability, supra note
287.
..
0 See note 313 supra. Despite the language of this section, many courts have held
collecting banks liable employing such rationales as: (1) narrowly defining "representative,"
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"or otherwise" language to include a contract cause of action would
appear to extend the same defense to an action in contract.32 1 Since
the issue was not presented, however, the Court preferred to avoid
any attempt to resolve it. 322 Nevertheless, the Hechter decision properly has placed the liability, and hence the duty to act with care
and caution, on the collecting banks, the party best able to prevent
the occurrence of such situations.
Neil M. Horwitz
see, e.g., Ervin v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 84 Dauphin 280,38 Pa. D. & C. 2d 473,3 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 311 (C.P. 1965); (2) narrowly defining "proceeds," see, e.g., Cooper v. Union Bank,
9 Cal. 3d 123, 136-37, 507 P.2d 609, 619-20, 107 Cal. Rptr. 1, 11-12 (1973); Sonnenberg v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 87 Misc. 2d 202, 205,383 N.Y.S.2d 863, 865 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1976); (3) finding that "reasonable commercial standards" had not been used, see,
e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 431 F.2d 341, 344 (5th Cir. 1970);
Salsman v. National Community Bank, 102 N.J. Super. 482, 493, 246 A.2d 162, 168 (Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1968), affl'd, 105 N.J. Super. 164, 251 A.2d 460 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969);
Belmar Trucking Corp. v. American Trust Co., 65 Misc. 2d 31, 36-37, 316 N.Y.S.2d 247, 254
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1970); or (4) ignoring UCC § 3-419 (3), see, e.g., Harry H. White
Lumber Co. v. Crocker-Citizens Nat'l Bank, 253 Cal. App. 2d 368, 61 Cal. Rptr. 381, 385 (Ct.
App. 1967); Mississippi Bank & Trust Co. v. County Supplies & Diesel Serv., Inc., 253 So.2d
828, 832-33 (Miss. Sup. Ct. 1971). The New York Court of Appeals has not decided the issue.
See 46 N.Y.2d at 38 n.3, 385 N.E.2d at 553 n.3, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 814 n.3; Hutzler v. Hertz
Corp., 39 N.Y.2d 209, 217 n.3, 347 N.E.2d 627, 632 n.3, 383 N.Y.S.2d 266, 270 n.3 (1976); note
309 supra.
321 This would appear to be the logical result of the Hechter Court's reasoning. The
Supreme Court, New York County, however, has held the defense to be invalid in a contract
action because the bank had not paid the "proceeds" of the instrument to the forger; therefore, the proceeds remained in the bank's hands for the payee. See Sonnenberg v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 87 Misc. 2d 202, 205, 383 N.Y.S.2d 863, 865 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1976).
lu 46 N.Y.2d at 38 n.3, 385 N.E.2d at 553 n.3 412 N.Y.S.2d at 814 n.3; Hutzler v. Hertz
Corp., 39 N.Y.2d 209, 217 n.3, 347 N.E.2d 627, 632 n.3, 383 N.Y.S.2d 266, 270 n.3 (1976).

